

Policy as per 11/1/80
for Foreign Integrated & Liaison Personnel
on 11.3

LOG NO.: 10303

DATE OF ITEM: 5-28-80 DATE RECEIVED 5-29-80

D/PAO COMMENTS:



DISPOSITION:

FILE: NFIB

ACTION: _____

COORDINATE WITH: _____

SUSPENSE DATE: _____

EA/PAO COMMENTS: _____

DESTROY

NFIB-9.1/40
18 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD

25X1A FROM : [REDACTED]
Secretary

SUBJECT : Policy on Uniform Security Procedures for Foreign
Integrated and Liaison Personnel in the United States (U)

The attached memorandum from the Chairman, NFIB, is forwarded for your
information and action, as appropriate. (U)

[REDACTED]

25X1A

Attachment
As Stated

Attachment to
NFIB-9.1/40
28 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Policy on Uniform Security Procedures for Foreign
Integrated and Liaison Personnel in the United States¹ (U)

1. In order to enhance the security of intelligence information,² the following uniform procedures are established for use within the Intelligence Community in relationships with representatives of foreign governments. These procedures apply to all accredited foreign representatives, both military and civilian, in the United States who are integrated within or serve in a liaison capacity with a member of the Intelligence Community and who have access to US intelligence information. (U)

2. For purposes of this Policy Statement, a foreign integrated officer is one who occupies a billet or slot requiring access to US intelligence information in a host US agency and who functions essentially as do US personnel of the host agency. A foreign liaison officer is one who is accredited by his government to one or more US departments or agencies, and whose duties include representing his own government in the exchange and/or discussion of intelligence. The provisions of this statement other than paragraph 3 below need not apply to foreign government representatives, civilian or military, who are in the US exclusively for training purposes or to foreign representatives in the US who have other than a normal liaison or integrated relationship. (U)

3. Appropriate officials of US departments or agencies to which foreign representatives are accredited or integrated should consult with legal counsel when appropriate, including the Department of Justice, to ensure compliance with the various laws requiring identification of persons in the US representing foreign entities. (U)

4. Security Assurances:

a. In every instance, there shall be required a written security assurance from the foreign government stating that its representative, as defined

¹This supersedes policy set forth in USIB-D-9.1/11 dated 20 September 1966.

²For purposes of this directive the term "intelligence information" means:

(a) "Foreign intelligence" and "counterintelligence" as those terms are defined in Executive Order 12036; and

(b) Information describing US foreign intelligence and counterintelligence sources and methods, activities, equipment and techniques used for the acquisition or exploitation of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence, foreign material obtained for intelligence exploitation, and imagery or data recordings resulting from US intelligence collection efforts.

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Attachment to
NFIB-9.1/40
28 May 1987

Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002100210005-7

above, has been specifically approved by that government to receive US classified information, and indicating the level of his security clearance and the area of his "need-to-know." (C)

b. The security assurance for such representative shall include the following biographic information:

- (1) Full name, date and place of birth.
- (2) Specifics, current foreign affiliation. (C)

5. Security Checks:

The US departments or agencies to which foreign representatives are accredited or integrated are responsible for making such security checks as they deem appropriate on these representatives. Any derogatory information developed by such checks or that comes to the attention of a host department or agency related to an accredited integrated or liaison officer shall be furnished to the CIA and the FBI. Derogatory information is herein construed as including, but not limited to, indications of doubtful loyalty to his own country, marked antipathy to the US Government, susceptibility to control by a hostile intelligence service or character defects of such a nature as to raise questions of his suitability to receive US classified intelligence. (C)

6. Central Indices:

a. Each department and agency will maintain a central index available to other members of the Intelligence Community of the identities of foreign integratees and intelligence liaison representatives accredited to them by sponsoring governments. The index within each department or agency will reflect the clearance level and area of need-to-know as certified by the sponsoring governments and as agreed to by the US department or agency. (U)

b. Each department and agency hosting foreign representatives certified by their sponsoring governments as authorized access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) and as having a need-to-know therefor, shall advise CIA (Compartmented Information Branch) of the identity and authorized SCI access of all such representatives. CIA (Compartmented Information Branch) will maintain a central index of all SCI accesses certified for foreign integrated and liaison personnel in the US. (U)

7. Interagency Activities:

a. As established by existing policy, no classified intelligence information originated in another department or agency shall be released to any accredited representative of a foreign government without the consent of the originating department or agency. Procedures and control markings concerning advanced consent by originating agencies for foreign release of intelligence and intelligence information are established by DCID 1/7. (U)

b. Any agency or department wishing to sponsor the attendance of an accredited foreign representative at an interagency meeting where classified intelligence information may be released or discussed shall give advance notice thereof to all other agencies whose information is or may be involved, and shall abide by any restrictions they may place on such attendance. (U)

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8. Control of Access:

All accredited representatives of foreign governments involved in or integrated into Intelligence Community activities should wherever possible be physically located so as to limit the possibility of inadvertent disclosure to them of classified intelligence information or data concerning US intelligence personnel and activities which exceeds such representatives' need-to-know. Access to classified US intelligence information should be afforded only through US personnel who are fully knowledgeable of the extent and scope of authorized need-to-know and clearance level of the accredited foreign representative. (C)

9. Exceptions:

In emergency situations clearly affecting the national interest wherein time does not permit meeting the requirements of this Policy Statement, a determination to permit access may be made by the Senior Intelligence Officer of the department or agency concerned. Necessary action to meet these requirements shall be taken as soon as possible thereafter. In the interim, the degree of access of the foreign representative shall be severely controlled and restricted to the particular situation justifying the emergency access. (U)

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STANSFIELD TURNER
Chairman